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Abstract:
The press is essential for creating an informed citizenry, but its existence depends on
attracting and maintaining an audience. It is unclear whether supply-side effects – including
those dictated by the owners of the media – influence how the media cover politics, yet this
question is essential given their abilities to set the agenda and frame issues that are covered.
We examine how ownership influences media behavior by investigating the impact of Rupert
Murdoch’s purchase of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in August 2007. We collect data on every
front-page story and editorial for 27 months, and we compare the difference in political
coverage between the New York Times (NYT) and WSJ using a difference-in-differences design.
We show that the amount of political content in the opinion pages of the two papers were
unchanged by the sale, but the WSJ’s front-page coverage of politics increased markedly
relative to the NYT. Similar patterns emerge when comparing the WSJ’s content to the USA
Today and the Washington Post. Our finding highlights potential limits to journalists’ ability to
fulfill their supposed watchdog role in democracies without interference from owners in the
boardroom.

The media occupy a curious position in society. On the one hand, a free press is thought
to be essential for a democratic and well-functioning society, as it is through the press that the
actions of the government and political elites can be revealed and held accountable. On the
other hand, the media are profit-maximizing businesses that aspire to maintain and grow
their audiences and that often report to owners concerned with profitability. No longer
subsidized by political parties – and with a competitive environment that allows consumers to
select nearly any media outlet they desire – media companies must create brands for which
consumers are willing to pay (Hamilton 2004).
The extent to which there is tension between the aspirational and economic
motivations of the press is unclear. We explore this tension by investigating the impact of
ownership on coverage decisions; when a new owner takes over a paper, does its political
coverage change as a consequence? It may seem obvious that ownership matters for
institutions whose coverage decisions define the brand being sold to consumers, but
systematic characterizations of the impact of changing ownership are based largely on
anecdotes or personal experiences.
Investigating the impact of ownership on coverage decisions is important because it is
well known that media can set both the social and political agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).
In fact, media firms represent valuable entities with high “amenity potential” given the
possibility that owners can systematically influence public opinion through their news outlets
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Understanding whether political coverage depends on who owns
the paper is critically important for assessing the media’s ability to inform citizens about the
actions of their government, but few studies examine the factors that determine which content
makes its way to the top of reporters’ and editors’ agendas (Nelson et al. 2011 but see, e.g.,
Dunaway 2008; Larcinese, Snyder and Puglisi 2011; Pew 2011; Wagner and Collins 2014). To
contribute to our understanding, we collect data on the content and emphasis given to stories
by leading newspapers to characterize how the coverage of politics changes in response to a
change in ownership.
In particular, we examine the impact of the sale of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) to
Rupert Murdoch on August 1, 2007 by collecting data on the daily content and coverage of the
WSJ and the New York Times (NYT) over 27 months. We compare changes in the front-page
and editorial content of the WSJ to that of the NYT over time to identify whether changing
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patterns in political coverage by the WSJ can be attributed to Murdoch rather than changes in
the news cycle or media environment. We further compare the increased political coverage in
the WSJ after the transfer of ownership we document to the coverage given by the USA Today
(USAT) and the Washington Post (WaPo), two papers that differ in the amount of attention
they traditionally give to politics.
Our primary interest is whether who controls the media affects the amount of
attention given to political issues, and we find clear evidence that it does. The editorial pages
of both the WSJ and NYT were equally likely to address political issues throughout the
examined time period, but the WSJ became increasingly more likely to feature political stories
on its front pages following Murdoch’s purchase than the NYT, USAT and the WaPo. Measuring
political coverage using the percentage of political stories on the front page and the
percentage of political stories above the fold reveals that the front-page coverage of the WSJ –
which had historically focused less on politics than the NYT – was only slightly less focused on
politics than the NYT following its sale1.
The fact that the amount of political coverage changed drastically only for the WSJ and
that the increase only occurred after the sale of the WSJ strongly suggests that who owns the
media matters. While some of the larger implications of this effect cannot be discerned from
this analysis – e.g., what the motivations were for the change we identify; how exactly the
coverage changed; the impact of the changes on the opinions of existing and new subscribers
– the results unambiguously demonstrate that the ownership of news organizations matters
for the news that gets covered. Better understanding the incentives of those responsible for
managing and producing the news is, therefore, important for assessing the role of the media
in a democracy; if media coverage depends at least in part on who owns the media as we
demonstrate, then questions emerge about the extent to which such media are able to fulfill
the normative role that they are typically ascribed.
1.

The Role of the Media & the Importance of Ownership
Journalists are often trained to view their work’s purpose as providing citizens with

the information needed to be “free and self-governing” and helping promote the conditions
required for accountability in a democratic system (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001, 12). Indeed,
1

Moreover, we are also able to use our daily content data to estimate the amount of time that it took for those changes
to reveal themselves. The data suggest that the change in political coverage by the WSJ was not fully evident until
December of 2007 – four months after Murdoch took over.
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works in political communication suggest that the information provided by the media can
help improve the provision of public goods (Besley and Burgess 2002) and levels of
accountability in government, as well as increase levels of political activity among citizens
(e.g., Prior 2007; Prat and Strömberg 2005; Snyder and Strömberg 2010). Additionally, a
large literature in political science examines the power of media to prime considerations (e.g.,
Iyengar and Kinder 1987) or frame an event in a manner that affects public opinion by
influencing how citizens process information (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007; Nelson et al.
1997).
Such literatures explore the consequences of media coverage, but they do not explore
the processes by which the media choose which information to present to citizen consumers.
The decision of which issues to cover is essential for understanding the media’s role in
shaping citizens’ awareness, and such coverage decisions are arguably influenced by a myriad
of factors – including both taste and profit motives.
Many explore important questions about how events are covered and whether media
outlets are “biased” in their coverage (e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Groseclose and Milyo
2005; Ho and Quinn 2008). Whether events are covered in a slanted direction because of
supply-side or demand-side forces is an ongoing debate (see, for example, the summary of
Prat and Strömberg 2013), and both theoretical and empirical evidence support both factors
(Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Stone 2016; Puglisi and Snyder 2015). On the supply-side, Baron
(2006) notes that some organizations may allow for journalists to inject bias into their
reporting as an alternative to higher salaries, and some find evidence of owners’ preferences
affecting the coverage of their respective newspapers to their own benefit (Gilens and
Hertzman 2000; Puglisi 2011). Numerous works also argue that there are demand-side
pressures created by preferences to consume news consistent with beliefs (e.g., Mullainathan
and Shleifer 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Chan and Suen 2008; Stroud 2008).
We take a step back to explore a different, but equally important issue – the discretion
involved in choosing whether or not to even cover political issues and how that coverage is
affected by who owns the media. The many excellent examinations of whether coverage is
“biased” are in some sense secondary to understanding the conditions under which political
events are even covered. Moreover, focusing on the extensiveness of political coverage rather
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than the nature of political coverage has the added virtue of contributing to our knowledge of
media effects while avoiding the many difficult debates about how best to measure bias.
Anecdotal evidence regarding the importance of media owners in shaping their news
outlets’ content is plentiful. Since buying The Washington Post, Jeff Bezos – also the founder
and CEO of Amazon.com – has urged the Post newsroom to focus on and experiment with
projects that have the potential for large-scaled digital growth (Meyer 2014). In the 2016
election cycle, the New York Observer – owned by Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner –
endorsed Trump in the Republican primary despite initial pledges that it would not cover him.
In fact, some argued that the New York Observer “did not hesitate to advance [Trump’s]
agenda” and pointed out that the Observer ran “a lengthy takedown” of Trump’s one-time
opponent, Marco Rubio (Mahler 2016).
More systematic and quantitative work in political communication has also
documented the power of newspaper owners in influencing the coverage of their papers (see
e.g., Bagdikian 1997). For instance, the ownership structure (e.g., public versus private)
appears to affect: the depth of issue coverage (Dunaway 2008), attention given to the “horserace” (Dunaway and Lawrence 2015) and the tone of political news stories (Dunaway 2013)
because privately owned media often have different goals – and fewer leaders at the helm to
impede the achievement of those goals – compared to public media corporations. Others have
argued that media owners with a vested interest in the coverage of certain topics (e.g., the
Citizens United ruling or 1996 Telecommunications Act) cover those topics in a personally
beneficial manner (Bailard 2016; Gilens and Hertzman 2000). Additional work suggests that
the NYT emphasized issues “owned” by Democrats more during presidential campaigns when
there was a Republican incumbent president – a shift that was attributed to a desire of the
paper’s owners to influence the election (Puglisi 2011).
Newspaper owners have also been known to publicize their views so that reporters are
able to tailor their coverage without direct intervention (Chomsky 1999). Chomsky (2006)
also argues that the owners of the NYT have sometimes directly intervened by choosing topics
for stories and guiding how stories are framed. An analysis of the correspondence between
Turner Catledge, the top editor at the NYT for nearly two decades, and former NYT owner and
publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger reveals that between 1956 and 1962, Catledge received 156
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story suggestions from Sulzberger and at times, Catledge would forward memos from
Sulzberger as his own (Chomsky 2006).
We examine the question of whether owners affect media coverage by focusing on
Rupert Murdoch’s purchase of the WSJ – the top-selling daily newspaper in the United States –
in August of 2007. Though the transaction involved a purchaser with a portfolio of rightleaning media companies (Jamieson and Cappella 2008), Murdoch was seeking to buy a
popular newspaper largely known for its front-page coverage of economic events and news;
thus, it was not obvious a priori that changes would occur. The paper’s relative success (it had
one of the highest daily circulations at the time) and the close connection that exists between
economic issues and the financial reputation of the company owning the WSJ (The Dow Jones
Company) arguably lessened the incentives to change the coverage of the WSJ and risk
alienating its existing audience.
Though there are reasons to think that coverage in the WSJ would remain stable after
its purchase from the Bancroft family – which had controlled the paper since 1902 – there are
also reasons to think that a change may have resulted because of either preference or profit
motives. To be clear, our analysis is able to identify whether a shift in coverage occurs with
the change in ownership, but we can only speculate about the possible reasons for a shift. One
possibility is a difference in taste: perhaps the Bancroft family had a preference for focusing
on economic news and this preference – again, seemingly justified by the fact that the WSJ
continued to be the top-selling daily newspaper in the years leading up to its 2007 sale – led
them to focus primarily on economic issues and events. Suggestive evidence of the
importance of the Bancrofts’ personal convictions is exemplified by the strong resistance that
some family members had to selling the WSJ to Murdoch because of how he might run the
paper even though Murdoch was offering a 67% premium over its share price (Tofel 2011).
In contrast, perhaps Murdoch had a difference of taste and a desire to increase political
coverage even if it risked subscriptions to the WSJ.
Alternatively, Murdoch may have thought that increasing political coverage would
result in increased profits – a view consistent with his experiences at other news outlets (e.g.,
Fox News). Though Hamilton (2004) notes some media outlets have boosted their amount of
soft news in an effort to revive disappointing ratings in an increasingly fragmented media era,
others suggest that political content can attract audiences (see Prat and Strömberg 2013 for
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overview). Even more, from a business perspective, the WSJ’s niche economic reporting would
possibly allow for higher profit margins vis-à-vis other daily papers.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We can only evaluate the profitability of decisions in retrospect, but the evidence
suggests that circulation of the WSJ increased after its sale. Figure 1 plots the annual
circulation levels (as of September) of the NYT and WSJ over nearly 30 years, and if we
compare the rate of change from 2007 to 2008, there is some evidence that the latter’s
circulations actually increased despite the financial crises (the WSJ’s circulation increased by
0.006% while those of the NYT decreased by -3.58%). The NYT did experience steep increases
in their circulations in the later years of Figure 1 (i.e., post-2010), but that could be due to
many factors: Democrats’ losses in the 2010 midterms (Archer forthcoming), a slowly
rebounding economy, or the establishment of an online paywall in 2011 that removed free,
unrestricted access to their content online.
2.

Research Design and Data
To explore whether a change in owners affects the issues covered by the media, we

collect data on every front-page story as well as information related to the emphasis given to
each story -- whether it occurs above the fold, whether it contains an associated photo, and
the size of the headline font -- for periods before and after the ownership change2. To help
disentangle editorial discretion from coverage decisions, we collect similar data on editorials
that attribute authorship to each paper’s Editorial Board. Because the content of the front
page is arguably more affected by real-world events than editorials, comparing the relative
change in coverage across papers and across these parts of the newspaper helps illuminate
the nature of the change in focus that may result from a change in ownership and emphasis.
We collect information on every story, article, or unsigned opinion appearing on either
the front page or the editorial page of the NYT and WSJ for every weekday in 2007 and 2008
(excluding holidays on which the papers did not print), and to help identify the potential
impact of the 2008 presidential election on coverage, we also collected the same data for the
months of March, July and November in 2004. For robustness, we also collect information on
the coverage of USA Today (USAT) and the Washington Post (WaPo) for selected weeks within
2

Prior studies that have shown that the front page of the WSJ covered business less in 2011 relative to 2007 both in
absolute terms and also relative to the NYT (Pew 2011), but such analyses focus almost entirely on post-purchase
coverage and face difficulties in controlling for potential changes in the news cycle and the media environment.
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each month. These two papers not only differ in their baseline proclivity to cover political
events, but they also have stable ownership structures over this time period.
Six coders were tasked with reading and coding the front-page stories and editorials.
The coders were trained together3 and asked to extract the headline(s) for each of these
articles or editorials. Once extracted, each piece was then coded for markers of prominence 4
and the content of the news coverage. That is, both front-page stories and editorials were
classified as mentioning the following political topics: public policy, a federal agency, the
president, Congress, the courts, candidates or campaigns and interest groups.
Our primary analysis uses a difference-in-differences design to compare the coverage
of the NYT and WSJ over time. This is an appropriate comparison because both papers are
located in New York City, and they compete for subscribers both nationally and locally. In
addition, they are two of the top three most prominent papers of record with print
circulations (Alliance for Audited Media 2013). Traditionally, the non-editorial coverage of the
WSJ was characterized as more focused on economic issues than political ones, but the
political positions taken by the Editorial Board in editorials were often political and
distinctive from those taken by the Editorial Board at the NYT. In terms of the “bias” for each,
studies routinely identify the NYT as a leftward-leaning paper and the WSJ as a rightwardleaning paper (e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010).
To identify the impact of the purchase of the WSJ by Rupert Murdoch, we use our newly
collected data to compare the extent to which political coverage differs along several metrics:
editorials, political stories on the front page and political stories on the front page that are
emphasized in various ways. By examining the difference in coverage between the two papers
over time, we are able to hold the larger political-social-economic environment fixed without
having to identify and control for every newsworthy event because the same events will exert
similar pressures on both papers, especially since both are headquartered in New York City.
3

During training, coders were given sample articles to code. Inter-coder reliability was rather high for items, including:
above the fold (kappa=0.85), top-right front-page position (kappa=0.96), mentioning the president (kappa=0.73), and
mentioning a candidate or campaign (kappa=0.57). Reviewing the differential codings for campaign mentions reveals
that when the politics of a current event was being discussed and the positions of candidates were also mentioned as an
aside there were differences of opinion as to whether the emphasis of the story was on current policymaking or
presidential campaign. For robustness, we estimated models with and without this measure and the results are
reassuringly substantively identical.
4
For front page news stories, the following were coded as markers of emphasis: whether or not the headline was in bold
font, the size of the headline font (largest on page), whether or not the headline is in all caps, if the story is above the
fold, if the story is in the top right position and if a photo accompanied the story.
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That is, analyzing the difference in coverage over time is important because it allows us to
examine how papers respond to identical circumstances while avoiding the impossible task of
trying to control for all relevant events that occurred during the time period of our analysis.
The second “difference” in the design involves the comparison of how the difference in
coverage patterns for the two papers changed following the sale of the WSJ to Rupert Murdoch
in August 2007. To the extent that the difference in the coverage changes following this sale,
we can interpret the change as being due to the change in ownership. To be clear, both papers
in the comparison may change their coverage in response to the purchase of the WSJ –
perhaps in response to the changing competitive landscape – but the effect we identify is
whether the WSJ experienced an even larger change.
3.

Changing Owners, Changing Coverage?
Figure 2 plots the proportion of political stories and editorials appearing in the

weekday papers of the WSJ and NYT across time – the top row graphs the trends for frontpage political stories by week and month and the bottom row depicts the trends for signed
editorials.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
It is immediately clear that the difference between the proportion of political stories on
the front pages of the WSJ and the NYT decreases dramatically after Murdoch’s purchase of
the WSJ. Prior to August 2007 (excluding our 2004 data), only 29.86% of the WSJ’s front-page
coverage focused on politics on average, compared to an average of 59.83% on the NYT’s front
pages. After August 2007, the mean percentage of the WSJ’s front-page stories jumped to
47.14% compared to 66.59% for the NYT.
While some of this may be due to events involving the 2008 presidential election, the
election alone cannot explain the large variation we identify. By way of comparison, for the
selected months we coded in the 2004 presidential election year, the average percentage of
front-page political stories in the WSJ was only 38.52% compared to 59.95% for the NYT. The
fact that the WSJ’s political coverage in 2004 was only slightly higher than it was in 2007 prior
to Murdoch’s purchase suggests that the 2008 presidential election cannot fully account for
the dramatic shift.
The right column of Figure 2 repeats the same analysis for editorials and reveals a
starkly different pattern. The editorials for both papers focused nearly exclusively on political
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issues prior to Murdoch’s purchase of the WSJ – before August 2007, 78.86% and 81.89% of
editorials were political in the WSJ and NYT, respectively – and the relative number of
politically-themed editorials in the WSJ did not substantially increase after its purchase. (After
Murdoch took over, 86.83% and 87.62% of the WSJ and NYT’s editorials were political5.)
Simple t-tests examining the differences in the proportions of political content on the
front and editorial pages of the two papers over time suggest the political content on the
editorial pages did not meaningfully change in response to the change in ownership; however,
the gap in political content on the front page shrank significantly in both substantive and
statistical terms (from -0.30 to -0.19; p=0.0016).
To characterize the change more completely and better control for possible
unobserved factors, we employ regression models to model the differences in coverage
between the NYT and WSJ using an indicator for the time after the sale of the WSJ – Murdoch –
and time fixed effects to control for variation in political events and remove temporally-based
confounders. Specifically, we estimate regressions of the form:
(WSJt – NYTt) = α + β ×Murdoch + θt

(1)

where WSJt and NYTt are the proportion of front-page stories or editorials in time period t
dealing with politics in each paper, α is the average difference between the WSJ’s and NYT’s
political coverage, β is the change in that difference following the first full week after
Murdoch’s purchase of the WSJ (which began on August 5, 2007), and θt are fixed effects at
either the calendar week7 (t=1...51) or calendar month (t=1…11) level. Note that positive
values of β represent an increase in the political coverage of the WSJ relative to the NYT postMurdoch and negative values represent the opposite.
For clarity, Table 1 reports the results using 2007 and 2008, but the findings are robust
to the inclusion of data from 2004 in the time period before Murdoch’s tenure8.
5

That said, while we focus on the amount of political coverage, others have found that editorials in the WSJ became less
supportive of economic government intervention and more likely to mention Democrats post-transition. The WSJ’s
editorial page also became more negative towards Democrats and more positive towards Republicans. Similar changes
did not occur in the editorial pages of the NYT or Washington Times, papers with liberal and conservative editorial
views, respectively, who did not experience changes in ownership (Wagner and Collins 2014). Kahn and Kenney (2002)
suggest there is a relationship between the explicit political positioning of newspaper editorials and the papers’
supposedly objective news content. Other analyses also find a positive relationship between bias scores for newspaper
editorials and three measures of news reporting (Ho and Quinn 2008).
6
See Online Appendix A for results.
7
Because of the misalignment of full weeks in 2007 and 2008, December 29-31, 2008, are dropped from analyses so
that only full weeks are included.
8
See Online Appendix A for analyses including 2004 data.
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Confirming the patterns evident in Figure 2, the first column of Table 1 reveals that the
relative percentage of political editorials did not significantly change following Murdoch’s
purchase of the WSJ – likely because both papers were already publishing such a high
proportion of political editorials.
In contrast, the results reported in columns 2 through 4 reveal meaningful and sizeable
changes in the WSJ’s front-page political coverage regardless of whether calendar week or
calendar month fixed effects are used to account for news cycle effects. While the WSJ
contained nearly half as many front-page political stories as the NYT prior to the purchase by
Murdoch, that difference fell considerably post-purchase. Prior to August 2007, there was a
30-percentage-point average gap between the NYT and the WSJ, but that gap shrunk by 10
percentage points on average (roughly 35%) after Murdoch’s purchase. While it is true that
each paper boosted its political coverage in 2008 relative to 2007 because of the presidential
election, the WSJ did so at a rate (57.87%) far greater than the NYT (11.30%).
To measure whether the attention given to political events also changed in response to
the change in ownership, Figure 3 plots the proportion of political stories (by week) above the
fold of the front page for the NYT and WSJ. The patterns suggest that in the select months for
2004 and most of 2007, the NYT had a higher proportion of front-page political stories above
the fold than the WSJ, but that this difference decreased substantially in 2008. Indeed, 44.84%
of front-page stories in the NYT, on average, were both political and above the fold in the
select months for 2004, compared to only 27.60% for the WSJ. Between January 2007 and
August 2007, the percentage of political, above-the-fold front-page stories was 41.31% in the
NYT and 14.61% in the WSJ – percentages that changed to 37.19% for the NYT and 27.49% for
the WSJ following Murdoch’s purchase of the WSJ.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 confirms the significance of this change by predicting the difference in political
front-page stories located above the fold (operationalized as WSJ minus NYT) before versus
after Murdoch. The results reveal a sizable increase in the emphasis of political stories
following the sale of the WSJ – the NYT went from having 26.7 percentage points more
political stories above the fold than the WSJ (from January to August 2007) to just 9.69
percentage points more than the WSJ after Murdoch’s purchase. While it is hard to determine
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definitively whether this is due to an increase in the number of political stories, the emphasis
given to political stories, or both, it is clear that relatively more political stories were being
promoted after Murdock took over the WSJ9.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 explore the results for other measures of emphasis: the
percentages of stories that were both political and in the top right position of the two papers’
front pages (placement in the top right of the front page has historically signaled that the
article is the most important of the day), and the percentage of front page political stories with
a photo. While the gap between the differences in these percentages closes over time, such
changes are neither substantively nor statistically impressive. These effects are not
completely attributable to more political events occurring post-purchase than before because
the results of all three models are robust to the inclusion of data from the 2004 presidential
election year (Table A3 of Online Appendix A).
The results of Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that political coverage increased in response
to a change in ownership at the WSJ, but sheds no light onto what was being included in that
additional coverage. To do so, we compare the changes in the frequencies of key words
related to politics within the headlines of editorials and front-page stories over time. Table 3
presents the percentage increase in the frequency of each word for both papers’ editorial
(columns 1 and 2) and front-page (columns 3 and 4) headlines from before Murdoch’s
purchase of the WSJ to after10.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Similar to Wagner and Collins (2014), Table 3 reveals clear evidence of the WSJ’s
editorial page headlines increasing their mentions of the word “Democrat(s)” and doing so at
a rate much greater than NYT editorials (650% vs. 100%). Additionally, the WSJ editorial page
headlines increased mentions of Obama at a rate much larger than any of the other words
listed in Table 3. More strikingly, there was a larger percentage increase for all of the key
political words in Table 3 on the WSJ’s front-page headlines compared to the NYT’s front-page
headlines. The largest relative increases for the WSJ occurred in its front-page mentions of

9

This effect is robust to controlling for the difference in the number of political front-page stories for each paper, which
does suggest that not only was the WSJ more likely to cover politics on its front page, but it was also more likely to
emphasize that political content. Analyses can be made available upon request.
10
See Online Appendix B for the raw frequencies of words mentioned before and after Murdoch’s purchase of the WSJ.
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presidential candidates running in 2008, particularly Obama and McCain. While this analysis
cannot tell us the tone of the coverage of each party, candidate or key figure, it does provide
insight into one of the ways in which the WSJ boosted its front-page and editorial political
content: by focusing more on the candidates for office, particularly Obama.
3.1

Is it All About the Campaign?
One potential concern with the results thus far is that the increase in the WSJ’s front-

page political content between 2007 and 2008 may have been due to the presidential election.
The fact that similar results emerge when we include coverage of the 2004 presidential
election provides some evidence that this is not likely to be the case, but we further probe the
robustness of our findings by repeating the analysis after removing all stories that focus on
the campaign and candidates. That is, this section asks: is there an increase in stories focused
on public policy, a federal agency, the president, Congress, the courts, or interest groups but
that do not mention presidential candidates or campaigns?
Table 4 reports the results. Similar to before, the results in columns 1 and 2 suggest
that there are not significant changes in the difference in political editorials between the two
papers over time. The results of column 3, however, reveal that there are significant changes
in the difference between the two papers’ political front-page content before and after
Murdoch’s acquisition of the WSJ. Column 3 of Table 4 reports a positive and significant
(b=0.11; p=0.001) bivariate relationship between the difference in the two papers’ political
front-page stories and the sale of the WSJ (Murdoch). Including calendar week fixed effects to
control for time-varying content in column 4 only increases the magnitude of the estimated
effect (b=0.16; p=0.00).
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Moreover, consistent with the impact being due to the change of ownership at the WSJ,
the decreased difference is due almost entirely to changes at the WSJ: the WSJ shifted from
29.15% of front-page stories having political content (excluding mentions of campaigns and
candidates) before Murdoch’s purchase to 45.58% after his purchase. During the same time
periods, the NYT experienced a much smaller increase from 58.28% political (non-campaign)
front-page stories to 63.16%.
3.2

Comparing Changes in the WSJ to Changes in Other Papers
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To ensure the robustness of our characterization, we also compare the coverage of the
WSJ to two other prominent papers with a national audience, the USA Today (USAT) and the
Washington Post (WaPo). The Graham family famously owned the WaPo for 80 years up until
Jeff Bezos’s purchase of the paper in the fall of 201311 (Farhi 2013), and USAT has been owned
by the Gannett Company since its initial development and publication in 1981 and 1982,
respectively.
We collect information on the number of political stories and total stories on the front
pages of these additional papers for the first full week of every month we examine (i.e., for all
of 2007 and 2008 and the months of March, July, and November for 2004), and we code the
text of each front-page story. (Online Appendix D graphs the time series of coverage over time
for the four papers.)
Unlike the NYT, the content of USAT is often less politically focused which means that
there is more room for an increase in coverage because of the 2008 election. We initially
replicate our previous analyses by differencing the average weekly amount of political
coverage in the WSJ relative to the WaPo and USAT; while the percentage of the WSJ’s political
front-page stories in the first week of every month increased by 21.27 percentage points, on
average, after Murdoch’s purchase of the paper, the USAT and WaPo only experienced
increases of 3.45 and 1.93 percentage points, respectively, during the same time period.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 shed light on the significance of those differences in changes
among the WSJ and each of the two new comparison papers. In each case, the bivariate
regressions suggest the gaps between the WSJ and the other papers decreased at a significant
rate. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 confirm that the 18- and 19-point decreases in the WSJ’s gap
in political coverage relative to the USAT and WaPo, respectively, remain substantively similar
after using fixed effects for calendar months to control for changing news cycles over time.
The p-value for the key coefficient in Column 4 comparing the WSJ to WaPo is only marginally
significant (p=0.15, two-tailed) but it is in the anticipated direction and it reaches
conventional levels of significance in a one-tailed test.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
We can also pool the results and use a model that explores the impact of the change in
ownership on coverage by estimating a specification predicting the percentage of political
11

There was a change in publisher in February 2008 and in executive editor in July 2008 (see Ahrens 2008).
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stories as a function of idiosyncratic paper effects and time using variations on the following
specification:
yit =  + 1 IWSJ +2 IUSAT + 3 IWAPO +  Murdoch + 4 (IWSJ *Murdoch) +5 (IUSAT *Murdoch) +
6 (IWAPO *Murdoch) + Murdoch + t
where IWSJ, IUSAT, and IWAPO are indicators for whether paper i is the WSJ, USAT or WaPo
respectively (the excluded paper is the NYT), Murdoch is an indicator if the date t is after the
sale of the WSJ and t capture the effects of time modelled using either calendar month fixed
effects or a time trend. Critical for our investigation are the interaction effects 4, 5, and 6
that capture how coverage changes following the sale of the WSJ. Although we include paper
and time fixed effects to account for systematic changes, we also cluster the standard errors
by paper to allow for different error structures using the wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller 2008) when feasible (note that we did not need to do so in prior analyses
because the dependent variable of interest was the difference in coverage)12.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The results of this pooled analysis are presented in Table 6. Specifications (1) and (2)
in Table 6 compare the coverage of the WSJ to a pooled comparison of the NYT, USAT, and
WaPo with (specification 2) and without (specification 1) calendar month fixed effects to
control for differences in the political news cycle across a given year. The results,
unsurprisingly, confirm earlier findings – while the WSJ is systematically less likely to cover
politics by 44% on average relative to the other papers, the percentage of front-page political
coverage post-purchase increases between 13% (specification 2) and 17% (specification 1).
Moreover, while a small fraction of this increase affects all papers, 12% of each estimated
increase is unique to the WSJ. Digging deeper and estimating a model with paper fixed effects
and separate effects by paper reveals continued support for the claim that the WSJ
experienced a substantively and statistically distinctive change in coverage after its sale to
Rupert Murdoch. Prior to the sale, the WSJ front page had 28% fewer political stories than the
NYT, but the difference shrank by 16% following the sale. While the WSJ is still less likely to
cover political events than the NYT and other major papers – perhaps owing to its legacy as
This dataset has an N=108: 27 weeks (one for each of the three months used previously from 2004, as well as
one for each month in 2007 and 2008) for each paper. Our ability to estimate clustered standard errors is limited
for some specifications given the small number of cases per paper and the inclusion of interactions alongside
paper and time fixed effects.
12
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the national economic paper of record – there is, nonetheless, clear evidence that the content
shifted dramatically following its sale to Rupert Murdoch. Moreover, the increase in political
coverage was not largely attributable to trends that produced a shift in the other papers, as
most of the increase we observe is unique to the WSJ13.
Taken together, examining the shifts in the political content on the front page of the
WSJ against those on the front pages of the NYT, USAT and the WaPo provides consistent
evidence that the WSJ experienced increases in its political content at a rate that far outpaced
its peer group of nationally circulated newspapers. Moreover, this increase is greater than
what might be expected from the 2008 election alone because it is greater than the changes
we observe in 2004, and evidence of the shift remains even after excluding stories that focus
on the 2008 campaign. As a result, our findings suggest that owners can meaningfully
influence their outlets’ coverage – particularly the news that makes the front pages of their
papers – and that better understanding the incentives and impact of owners’ decisions is
important for understanding the role of the media.
4.

Conclusion
Democracies rely on the “fourth estate” to provide critical coverage of the elites

representing the masses. It is well known that the media have powerful effects through
framing, priming and setting the agenda for political and social discourse, but
characterizations of the processes leading to the selection of some content over other is
comparatively rare. We collect and analyze new data from real-world newspaper coverage to
demonstrate that a powerful way that agenda-setting can occur is through the influences of
media owners.
We find evidence consistent with the claim that who owns the news matters when it
comes to the content on the front pages of the WSJ, one of the top newspapers in America. We
show that the amount of front-page political coverage in the WSJ – and also the emphasis that
is given to political events – increased markedly after the sale of the paper to Rupert Murdoch
relative to the change in front-page political coverage in the NYT, USAT and the WaPo. While
our analysis does not probe the important question of how those political events were

While the 95% confidence interval for the shift that is unique to the WSJ ranges from [-0.02,0.21] with a point
estimate of 0.10 recall that this assumes that the transition occurs immediately upon the sale of the WSJ. If we
allow a few weeks for an effect to emerge the point estimate of the interaction increases to 0.20 with a 95%
confidence interval ranging from [.10,.32].
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covered, the fact that more politics was being covered is suggestive of the impact of
ownership on the stories being covered by the press.
Our findings highlight the essential tension facing journalists and the “free press.”
While the media are free from governmental interference, they are still a political institution
in that they are entrenched in policymaking and elections; that is, they are an institution “that
acts apart from, but in the middle of, politics” (Esser 2001, 22). Even more, they are not free
from market forces and the necessity of delivering profits or other benefits to their owners.
And though this particular case may have led to increased political coverage in a major
national newspaper – a result that could be beneficial at least at face value – not all instances
of ownership influence lead to the same result. For instance, conservative billionaire and
political influencer Sheldon Adelson’s purchase of the Las Vegas Review-Journal in 2015 led to
changes in the paper’s journalistic practices that undercut editorial freedom (particularly
freedom in covering Adelson’s business, legal, and political affairs) to the point where
reporters and editors left the paper (Peralta 2015; Wagner 2016). Further, Murdoch’s own
news outlets in the UK are known to have pointed political agendas and to have boasted about
their influence over elections (Douglas 2010). Future work might examine the structure of
news outlets’ ownership in cross-national contexts to deepen our understanding of these key
findings as well as how differences in political institutions and the media environment affect
one another.
Given the critical role that the press occupies in creating informed citizens and holding
elected officials responsible for their actions, the impact of changing ownership we document
suggests many critical questions remain regarding the incentives for why the press chooses to
cover the stories and events that it chooses to cover. Future qualitative and quantitative work
might delve deeper into the personal motivations of owners’ decisions to affect news coverage
(e.g., in support of one policy or not as in Bailard 2016 and Gilens and Hertzman 2000)
because this will help us better understand the types of incentives that lead to particular
changes in news coverage, as well as the specific effects such coverage changes have on public
opinion about various policies, practices, and politicians.
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TABLES
Table 1 Differences in Political Content
Editorials Front-Page Front-Page Front-Page

Murdoch
(Std. Err.)
Intercept

[by Week]

[by Week]

[by Week]

[by Month]

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.02

0.10***

0.15***

0.15**

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.06)

-0.03

-0.30***

-0.62***

-0.47***

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.12)

(0.10)

No

No

Yes

Weekly Fixed
Effects
Monthly Fixed
Effects

Yes

N

104

104

104

24

R2

0.008

0.09

0.50

0.47

Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tailed.
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Table 2 Differences in Emphasis of Political Front-Page Stories by Week
Stories

Stories Stories

Above

in Top

with a

the Fold

Right

Photo

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.16***

0.03

0.04

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

-0.49***

-0.12**

-0.15*

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.08)

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

104

104

104

R2

0.66

0.49

0.58

Murdoch
(Std. Err.)
Intercept
Weekly Fixed
Effects

Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tailed.
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Table 3 Percent Change in Frequency of Key Words in Headlines Before and After Murdoch
% Change in

% Change in

% Change in

% Change in

NYT Editorial WSJ Editorial NYT Front-Page WSJ Front-Page
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

100

650

69.70

155.56

Republican 300*

0

100

200

GOP

100*

100

44.44

200

Bush

50

500

41.67

42.86

Pelosi

100*

700

-100

0

Obama

900*

2,650

1,038.46

3,150

McCain

900*

850

825

3,100

Clinton

200*

133.33

435.71

1,266.67

Democrat

Note: * denotes values that equaled 0 before Murdoch’s purchase of the WSJ but were transformed to
equal 1 so that percentage changes could be calculated. Cell entries are the percent change in the
frequencies of each word in the headlines of both editorials (columns 1 and 2) and front-page stories
(columns 3 and 4) from before to after Murdoch’s purchase. Frequency counts include both the
singular and plural (or possessive) forms of each word.
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Table 4 Differences in Political Content Excluding Stories About Campaign
Editorials

Editorials Front-Page Front-Page

[by Week] [by Week]

[by Week]

[by Week]

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.03

0.02

0.11***

0.16***

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.04

-0.03

-0.02

-0.29***

-0.61***

0.02

0.09

0.03

0.12

No

Yes

No

Yes

N

104

104

104

104

R2

0.009

0.52

0.10

0.50

Murdoch
(Std. Err.)
Intercept
Weekly Fixed
Effects

Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tailed. Stories about campaigns or candidates excluded from
coding of political stories.
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Table 5 Differences in Political Content –
Comparisons with USA Today and Washington Post
Front-Page Front-Page Front-Page Front-Page
vs. USAT

vs. USAT

vs. WaPo

vs. WaPo

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.18***

0.16*

0.19***

0.15

(0.06)

(0.08)

(0.06)

(0.10)

-0.55***

-0.54***

-0.61***

-0.53***

(0.05)

(0.13)

(0.05)

(0.16)

No

Yes

No

Yes

N

24

24

24

24

R2

0.27

0.57

0.30

0.43

Murdoch
(Std. Err.)
Intercept
Fixed Effects

Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tailed. Data consists of coding for first full week in each
month. Results are substantively similar including data from selected months in 2004.
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Table 6 Pooled Analysis of Political Coverage

WSJ

Front-Page

Front-Page

Front-Page

[by Week]

[by Week]

[by Week]

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.44

-0.44

-0.28

[-0.55,-0.33] [-0.55,-0.33] [-0.37,-0.19]
WaPo

0.28
[0.20,0.38]

USAT

0.21
[0.12,0.30]

Murdoch X

0.12

0.12

0.10

WSJ

[0.10,0.14]

[0.10,0.14]

[-0.02,0.21]

Murdoch X

-0.05

WaPo

[-0.17,0.06]

Murdoch X

-0.02

USAT

[-0.13,0.10]

Murdoch

0.05

0.01

0.07

[0.03,0.07]

[-0.02,0.04]

[-0.01,0.16]

0.78

0.81

0.62

[0.67,0.89]

[0.78,0.85]

[0.55,0.68]

No

Yes

No

N

108

108

108

R2

0.59

0.61

0.78

Intercept
Month Fixed
Effects

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported. Specifications (1) and (2) use wild bootstrap
standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008) clustered by paper. Data consist of the
first full week of each month in 2007 and 2008 as well as three months from 2004. Murdoch is
an indicator for weeks following the sale of the WSJ in August 2007.
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FIGURES
Figure 1 Weekday Circulation Levels of NYT and WSJ
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Figure 2 Proportion of Political Front-Page Stories and Editorials Across Time

Note: Figures include smoothing curve line fitted by LOESS with smoothing parameter set to 0.4 and 0.5
for weekly and monthly data, respectively.
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Figure 3. Proportion of Political Stories Above the Fold

Note: Figure includes smoothing curve line fitted by LOESS with smoothing parameter set to 0.4.
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